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We present an improved statistical fluctuation analysis for measurement device independent quan-
tum key distribution with three-intensity decoy-state method. Taking the statistical fluctuations
for different sources jointly, we present more tightened formulas for some key quantities used in
calculating the secure final key. Numerical simulation shows that, given the total number of pulses
1012, our method improves the key rate by about 97% for a distance of 50kms compared with the
result given by Xu., et al. (Phys. Rev. A 89, 052333); and improves the key rate by 146% for a
distance of 100kms compared with the result from full optimization of all parameters but treating
the statistical fluctuations traditionally, i.e., treating the fluctuations for different sources separately.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
successful applications of quantum information process-
ing. QKD can provide unconditional security based on
the laws of quantum physics [1, 2]. However, due to
the imperfections in real-life implementations of QKD,
a large gap between its theory and practice remains un-
filled. Security for real set-ups of QKD [1, 2] has become
a major problem in this area. The major imperfectitons
in practical QKD are imperfect single-photon source and
the limited efficiency of the detectors. Fortunately, by
using the decoy-state method [3–13], it has been shown
that the unconditional security of QKD can still be as-
sured with an imperfect single-photon source [14, 15].
The limited detection efficiency is another threaten to the
security [16]. To patch up this, several approaches have
been proposed, including the so called device indepen-
dent QKD (DI-QKD) [17] and the measurement-device
independent QKD (MDI-QKD) which was based on the
idea of entanglement swapping [18, 19]. The key idea of
MDI-QKD is that both legitimate users, Alice and Bob,
are senders. Neither Alice nor Bob performs any mea-
surement, they only send out quantum signals to the un-
trusted third party (UTP), who is supposed to perform a
Bell state measurement to each pulse pairs. After Alice
and Bob send out signals, they wait for UTP’s announce-
ment of weather he has obtained a successful event after
detection, and proceed to the standard postprocessing of
their sifted data. By using the decoy-state method, Alice
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and Bob can use imperfect single-photon sources [19–21]
securely in the MDI-QKD. Hence, the decoy-state MDI-
QKD can remove all detector side-channel attacks with
imperfect single-photon sources. Because of these im-
portant advantages, the decoy-state MDI-QKD has been
studied extensively both experimentally [22–24] and the-
oretically [20, 25–36].
As is well known, in any real experiment, the key size
is finite and we have to consider the effect of statistical
fluctuations caused by a finite key size. Such an analy-
sis is crucial to ensure the security of MDI-QKD hence
it has drawn much attentions [25–27, 30, 36]. Though a
non-zero secure key with statistical fluctuations is proven,
the key rate value is rather limited. In all these works,
the statistical fluctuations of each sources are considered
separately. Relations among the statistical fluctuation of
different sources are not considered. Actually, as shown
in this paper, the relationship among statistical fluctua-
tions of different sources takes an important role in the
key rate improvement. By considering them jointly, we
obtain more tightened bounds of sZ11 and e
X
11 which lead
to a much higher key rate.
In what follows, we shall first review the decoy-
state MDI-QKD for both asymptotic results and non-
asymptotic results, and then show our main idea for the
improvement through considering the fluctuations of dif-
ferent sources jointly in the first part of section III. In the
second part of section III, we systematically present our
improved statistical fluctuation analysis by introducing
relations among the fluctuations of different sources. We
then present the numerical simulation results in section
IV. The article is ended with a concluding remark.
2II. THREE-INTENSITY DECOY-STATE
METHOD FOR MDI-QKD
In the MDI-QKD protocol, each time a pulse-pair (two-
pulse state) is sent to the relay for detection. The relay is
controlled by an UTP. The UTP will announce whether
the pulse-pair has caused a successful event. Those bits
corresponding to successful events will be post-selected
and further processed for the final key. Since in prac-
tice only imperfect single-photon sources are available,
we need the decoy-state method for security in practice.
In the three-intensity decoy-state protocol, we assume
Alice (Bob) has three different sources, say oA, xA,
yA (oB, xB , yB) which can only emit three different
states in photon number space ρoA = |0〉〈0|, ρωxA , ρωyA
(ρoB = |0〉〈0|, ρωxB , ρωyB) respectively, where the super-
script indicates the basis information, ω = X for X basis
and ω = Z for Z basis. We denote
ρωxA =
∑
k
aωk |k〉〈k|, ρωyA =
∑
k
a′ωk |k〉〈k|, (1)
ρωxB =
∑
k
bωk |k〉〈k|, ρωyB =
∑
k
b′ωk |k〉〈k|, (2)
where aωk , a
′ω
k , b
ω
k and b
′ω
k are nonnegative parameters.
We shall consider the decoy-state method in each basis
separately. For simplicity, we shall omit the superscripts
ω in what follows of this article provided that the omis-
sion does not cause any confusion. In particular, since
we assume to implement the decoy-state method in each
bases, when we say any source lr, we always mean source
lr in a certain basis ω. We request the states above sat-
isfy the following very important condition
a′k
ak
≥ a
′
2
a2
≥ a
′
1
a1
,
b′k
bk
≥ b
′
2
b2
≥ b
′
1
b1
, (3)
for k ≥ 2 so that the decoy-state results can apply[20].
Imperfect sources used in practice such as the coherent
state source, the heralded source out of the parametric-
down conversion, satisfy the above conditions.
At each time, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses source
lA (rB) with probability plA (prB ). Conditional on this
source selection, she (he) chooses basis ω with probabil-
ity pω|lA (pω|rB). Here l = o, x, y (r = o, x, y). The pulse
from Alice and the pulse from Bob form a pulse pair and
are sent to UTP. We regard equivalently that each time
a two-pulse source is selected and a pulse pair (one pulse
from Alice, one pulse from Bob) is emitted. For postpro-
cessing, Alice and Bob evaluate the data sent in two bases
separately. The Z-basis is used for key generations, while
the X-basis is used for testing against tampering and the
purpose of quantifying the amount of privacy amplifica-
tion needed. Here, we use the capital letters Z(X) for
the bases and the lowercase letters o, x, y for the differ-
ent sources. Here and after, we omit the subscripts A
and B provided that this does not cause any confusions.
A. Asymptotic case
As shown in Ref.[20], we denote lr as the two-pulse
source when Alice uses source l and Bob uses r, and l, r
can take o, x, y. For example, two-pulse source oy denote
the case when Alice use vacuum source o and Bob uses
the signal source y. There are nine two-pulse sources lr in
each bases of the three-intensity protocol. We also denote
Slr as the yield of two-pulse source lr (in a certain basis,
X or Z). Slr are observed values and will be regarded
as known values here. However, the yields slrmn for the
two-pulses states |m〉〈m| ⊗ |n〉〈n| out of source lr cannot
be directly observed. In the asymptotic case, we assume
that slrmn for all lr are the same and we can denote all of
them by smn, i.e.
slrmn = smn, (4)
for all l, r = o, x, y. Given this, we can formulate the very
important unknown variable s11 by using relations
Slr =
∑
m,n
clrmnsmn, (5)
if the state for the two-pulse source lr is
ρlr =
∑
m,n
clrmn|m〉〈m| ⊗ |n〉〈n|. (6)
In order to calculate the secret final key rate of this pro-
tocol, we need the lower bound of the yield s11 and the
upper bound of the error rate e11. In Ref. [20], Wang pre-
sented the first explicit formula for the practical decoy-
state implementation through using part of the above
constraints given by Eq.(5), sources lr(l, r = o, x, y) ex-
cept xy and yx. Without losing the generality, we assume
Ka =
a′1b
′
2
a1b2
≤ a′2b′1
a2b1
= Kb. Then the lower bound of s11
can be estimated by the following explicit formula [20]
sˆ
(1)
11 =
Sˆ
(1)
+ − Sˆ(1)−
a1a′1b˜12
, (7)
where b˜12 = b1b
′
2 − b′1b2, Sˆ(1)+ = S(1)+ (Sxx, Soy, Syo, Soo)
and Sˆ
(1)
− = S(1)− (Syy, Sox, Sxo) with functions
S(1)+ (z1, z2, z3, z4) = a′1b′2z1 + a1b2a′0z2 + a1b2b′0z3
+(a′1b
′
2a0b0 − a1b2a′0b′0)z4, (8)
S(1)− (z1, z2, z3) = a1b2z1 + a′1b′2a0z2 + a′1b′2b0z3.(9)
Furthermore, in the case of Ka > Kb, the lower bound of
s11 can be calculated with Eq.(7) by making the exchange
between ak and bk, and the exchange between a
′
k and b
′
k
for k = 1, 2.
Besides this formula, we also present another formula
to estimate the lower bound of s11 for this three-intensity
protocol [31], through using another part of constraints
given by Eq.(5), i.e., the constraints for sources lr(l, r =
3o, x, y) except yy. Explicitly, the lower bound of s11 can
be estimated by the following explicit formula
sˆ
(2)
11 =
Sˆ
(2)
+ − Sˆ(2)−
a1b1a˜12b˜12
, (10)
where a˜12 = a1a
′
2 − a′1a2, b˜12 = b1b′2 −
b′1b2, Sˆ
(2)
+ = S(2)+ (Sxx, Soy, Syo, Soo) and Sˆ(2)− =
S(2)− (Sxy, Syx, Sox, Sxo) with
S(2)+ (z1, z2, z3, z4) = gxxz1 + goyz2 + gyoz3 + gooz4, (11)
S(2)− (z1, z2, z3, z4) = gxyz1 + gyxz2 + goxz3 + gxoz4,(12)
and
gxx = a1a
′
2b1b
′
2 − a′1a2b′1b2, gxy = b1b2a˜12,
gyx = a1a2b˜12, goy = a0gxy, gyo = b0gyx,
goo = a0b0gxx − a0b′0gxy − a′0b0gyx
= a0b2a˜12b˜01 + b0a1a˜02b˜12,
gox = a0gxx − a′0gyx = a1a˜02b˜12 + a0b′1b2a˜12,
gxo = b0gxx − b′0gxy = b0a1a′2b˜12 + b2a˜1b˜01.
In above equations, we denote a˜02 = a0a
′
2 − a′0a2 and
b˜01 = b0b
′
1 − b′0b1. With the conditions listed in Eq.(3),
we can easily prove that glr ≥ 0 for all l, r = o, x, y.
As discussed in Ref. [31], we know that the lower bound
sˆ
(2)
11 is always better than sˆ
(1)
11 in the asymptotic case.
Whereas, in the non-asymptotic case, we need reanalysis
the relation between them. Actually, the priority of sˆ
(2)
11
will disappear in the case of reasonable data-size for a
long enough key distribution distance.
Besides the lower bound of s11, we can estimate the
upper bound of e11 with the following explicit formula
eˆ11 = (Tˆ+ − Tˆ−)/(a1b1sˆ11), (13)
where
Tˆ+ = Txx + a0b0Too, Tˆ− = a0Tox + b0Txo, (14)
and sˆ11 is the lower bound of s11 which can be estimated
by using Eq.(10).
B. Non-asymptotic case
In any real experiment, the total pulses sent by Alice
and Bob are finite. So the number of sifted keys is always
finite. In order to extract the secure final key, we have
to consider the effect of statistical fluctuations caused by
the finite-size key. In the non-asymptotic case, yields of
the same two-pulse state out of different sources are not
always equal to each other rigorously. That is to say, we
need treat them differently, i.e.,
slrmn 6= sl
′r′
mn, (15)
for different two-pulse sources lr and l′r′ (lr 6= l′r′). For
example, for two-pulse sources xx and xy, we have sxxmn 6=
sxymn from Eq.(15) with lr = xx and l
′r′ = xy. In such a
case, there are too many variants {slrmn|m,n ≥ 0; l, r =
o, x, y}. To obtain the lower bound value for s11 and the
upper bound value for e11, one can implement the idea
of Ref.[13], i.e., treating the averaged yield of a specific
state from different sources. As was shown there [13],
in the BB84 decoy-state method, one can introduce the
averaged value for the yield of anm-photon state from all
sources in the same basis. The same idea can obviously
apply for the decoy-state method MDI-QKD, i.e., treat
these variants slrmn uniformly by introducing the mean
values. Accordingly, define 〈smn〉 as the mean value of
yield of state |mn〉 produced by all sources used in the
decoy-state method (in a certain basis),
〈smn〉 =
∑
lr
plprc
lr
mns
lr
mn. (16)
Based on this, we can also define quantity
〈Slr〉 =
∞∑
m,n=0
clrmn〈smn〉. (17)
Replacing Slr by 〈Slr〉 in Eq.(5), we can formulate the
lower bound of 〈s11〉. Note that even though Slr are
known values directly observed in an experiment, 〈Slr〉
are not. However, given the values Slr and Nlr, we have
〈Slr〉 = Slr (1 + δlr) . (18)
With a probability larger than 1 − ǫ, δlr is in the range
of
|δlr| ≤ nδ
√
1
NlrSlr
, δlr, (19)
where Nlr is the number of pulses sent out by Alice and
Bob when they use sources l and r respectively, nδ is the
number of standard deviations one chooses for statistical
fluctuation analysis with the given security bound. With
these notations, we know that NlrSlr is the number of
successful event announced by UTP when Alice and Bob
use sources l and r respectively.
In Ref.[13], nδ is set to be 10. Here in this paper we
shall set
nδ = 5.3, (20)
which corresponds to ǫ = 10−7[30, 36] in our numerical
simulation, so as to make a fair comparison with [36].
Therefore, we can formulate the lower bound value of
〈s11〉 by 〈Slr〉.
In order to get a reasonable lower bound of s11 in the
non-asymptotic case, we reconsider the explicit formulas
Eq.(7) first. As discussed above, in the non-asymptotic
case, the observed values are different from its mean val-
ues. So we need to replace Slr by its mean values 〈Slr〉
4defined in Eq.(18). Then the formula turns into a func-
tion of quantities δlr.
In the security proof, we assume that Eve can do any-
thing except to violate rules of the nature. In order to
obtain a reasonable estimation of the lower bound of s11,
we should find out the worst case under the constraints
about δlr given by Eq.(19). If one simply treats all δlr
separately, the worst case result is
s
(1)
11 =
S
(1)
+ − S
(1)
−
a1a′1b˜12
, (21)
where S
(1)
+ = S(1)+ (Sxx, Soy, Syo, Soo), S
(1)
− =
S(1)− (Syy, Sox, Sxo) with S(1)+ , S(1)− being defined in
Eqs.(8,9) respectively, and
Slr = Slr(1− δlr), Slr = Slr(1 + δlr). (22)
for all l, r = o, x, y. In above equations, δlr is the upper
bound of the δlr given by Eq.(19).
Besides this lower bound, we can also obtain the other
one from Eq.(10) in the same way. Explicitly, we have
s
(2)
11 =
S
(2)
+ − S
(2)
−
a1b1a˜12b˜12
, (23)
where S
(2)
+ = S(2)+ (Sxx, Soy, Syo, Soo), S
(2)
− =
S(2)− (Sxy, Syx, Sox, Sxo) with S(2)+ , S(2)− being defined in
Eqs.(11,12) respectively, Slr and Slr being defined in
Eq.(22).
In Ref. [31], we have shown that the lower bound sˆ
(2)
11
is always better than sˆ
(1)
11 with the same experimental
parameters in the asymptotic case. However, in the non-
asymptotic case, the lower bound s
(1)
11 can be better than
s
(2)
11 in the case of reasonable data-size for a long enough
key distribution distance. So we should choose the bigger
one. Explicitly, we define the new lower bound of s11 for
this three-intensity protocol as follows
s11 = max{s(1)11 , s(2)11 }, (24)
where s
(1)
11 and s
(2)
11 are defined in Eq.(21) and Eq.(23)
respectively.
Similarly, one can also work out the averaged value of
〈e11〉 by 〈Tlr〉 with
〈Tlr〉 =
∞∑
m,n=0
clrmn〈smn〉〈emn〉, (25)
being the error yields. Here in Eq.(25), we define the
mean value 〈smn〉〈emn〉 =
∑
lr plprc
lr
mns
lr
mne
lr
mn. By in-
troducing the relative fluctuations τlr, we can write the
relation between error yields 〈Tlr〉 and the observed value
Tlr as follows
〈Tlr〉 = Tlr(1 + τlr), (26)
for all l, r = o, x, y. Similarly, after giving the security
bound, τlr can be bounded by
|τlr| ≤ nτ
√
1
NlrTlr
, τ lr, (27)
where nτ is the number of standard deviations one
chooses for statistical fluctuation analysis with the given
security bound, NlrTlr is the error count when Alice and
Bob use sources l and r respectively.
In this three-intensity protocol, we can use the follow-
ing explicit formula to estimate the upper bound of e11
e11 = (T+ − T−)/(a1b1s11), (28)
where
T+ = T xx + a0b0T oo, T− = a0T ox + b0T xo, (29)
with s11 being the lower bound of s11 which can be esti-
mated by using Eq.(24) and
T lr = Tlr(1− τ lr), T lr = Tlr(1 + τ lr). (30)
In the above equations, τ lr is the upper bound of τlr
defined in Eq.(27).
Here in this work, instead of using this simple worst-
case calculation [36], we propose a more efficient method
to treat the statistical fluctuations in the decoy-state
MDI-QKD. In our method, we don’t have to consider the
fluctuation of each quantities separately. For example,
in estimating the quantity T− in Eq.(29), in a symmet-
ric protocol where a0 = b0, we need to calculate bound
of Tox + Txo. The simple worst-case result would calcu-
late the worst-case fluctuation for Txo and Tox separately.
However, we can treat this more efficiently by consider-
ing the statistical fluctuations jointly. Say, we regard
sources ox and xo as one source ox + xo which emits
state 12 (ρox + ρxo). For such a source, the error yield
Txo+ Tox = 2Tox+xo. We then only need to consider the
fluctuation for only one quantity Tox+xo. This will im-
prove the performance of the decoy-state protocol. In the
next section we present a systematic study of this joint
constraints in the statistical fluctuation.
III. IMPROVED STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION
ANALYSIS
In order to estimate the lower bound of s11 and the up-
per bound of e11, we need the values of yields Slr and er-
ror yields Tlr (l, r = o, x, y for this three-intensity decoy-
state protocol), which can be observed in experiment.
On the other hand, in any real experiment, we have to
consider the effect of statistical fluctuation caused by a
finite-size key. As discussed above, we need to introduce
quantities δlr and τlr to obtain the values of yields 〈Slr〉
and error yields 〈Tlr〉 with its observed values Slr and Tlr.
With a given security bound, we can bound δlr and τlr,
such as the relations presented in Eq.(19) and Eq.(27).
5In all previous works, the all fluctuations δlr for different
lr are treated separately and independently and so do all
quantities of τlr for different lr. In this section, we will
introduce some relations among them first. With these
relations, we then present improved formulas to estimate
the lower bound of s11 and the upper bound of e11 which
lead to a much higher rate in distilling the secure final
key.
A. Relations among the fluctuations of different
sources
When we do the statistical fluctuation analysis, we
need to choose a proper security bound first. With a
given definite security bound, we can bound δlr and τlr
by Eq.(19) and Eq.(27) respectively. In order to obtain
the relations among these quantities, we need to recon-
sider the grouping of the successful events announced by
UTP.
For clarity, we consider the relation between τox and
τxo first. As defined above, we know that τox and τxo
are the relative fluctuations for the observed error yields
Tox and Txo respectively. These two observable are corre-
sponding to the successful events with different two-pulse
sources ox and xo. If we group all those successful events
of these two sources together, and denote J = {ox, xo},
the relation between the error yield TJ and its mean value
〈TJ〉 is
〈TJ〉 = TJ(1 + τJ ), (31)
where τJ is the relative fluctuation for the observable
TJ . Similarly, τJ has the following property with given
security bound
|τJ | ≤ nτ√
NoxSox +NxoSxo
, τ¯J . (32)
In this relation, NoxSox +NxoSxo is the number of error
counts when Alice and Bob use two-pulse sources ox and
xo. Reconsidering the definition of TJ , we know that
NoxTox +NxoTxo = (Nox +Nxo)TJ .
Now we take into account the mean values. The above
relation can be written into
Nox〈Tox〉+Nxo〈Txo〉
= NoxTox(1 + τox) +NxoTxo(1 + τxo)
= (NoxTox +NxoTxo)(1 + τJ).
Then we have the relation between these two quantities
τox and τxo
|NoxToxτox +NxoTxoτxo| ≤ nτ
√
NoxTox +NxoTxo.(33)
Here we have used Eq.(32). Similarly, the relation be-
tween any two different quantities τl1r1 and τl2r2 can be
written into
|Nl1r1Tl1r1τl1r1 +Nl2r2Tl2r2τl2r2 |
≤ nτ
√
Nl1r1Tl1r1 +Nl2r2Tl2r2 , (34)
with l1, r1, l2, r2 each can be any one of o, x or y and
l1r1 6= l2r2.
Generally, we can group the successful events of a num-
ber of two-pulse sources together. To see it more clearly,
we define the set
J = {lr|l, r = o, x, y} (35)
as the whole set of all possible two-pulse sources (in a
certain basis) used by Alice and Bob in the protocol.
Explicitly, J = {oo, ox, xo, oy, yo, xx, xy, yx, yy} in any
basis. With this notation, we can write all the relations
among τlr into∣∣∣∣∣
∑
lr∈J
NlrTlrτlr
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ nτ
√∑
lr∈J
NlrTlr, (36)
for all nonempty J ⊆ J and
∑
lr∈J
NlrTlrτlr = 0. (37)
The last equation is deduced from the fact that∑
lr∈J
Nlr〈Tlr〉 =
∑
lr∈J
NlrTlr.
Specifically, if set J contains only one element lr, then
the relations presented in Eq.(36) is just the bound for
τlr shown in Eq.(27). If set J contains two elements, say
J = {l1r1, l2r2}, then the relations presented in Eq.(36)
is just the relation between two quantities τl1r1 and τl2r2
given by Eq.(34).
It should be noted that there are nine different τlr in
Eq.(26) for this three-intensity protocol in each basis,
if we consider all possible lr. Furthermore, in Eq.(36)
and Eq.(37), there are
∑9
k=2 Ck9 = 29 − 9 − 1 = 502
joint constraints and C19 = 9 boundary constraints for
these nine quantities. It is a hard work to obtain an
explicit formula to estimate the lower bound of 〈t11〉 =
〈s11〉〈e11〉 from Eq.(25) with all these constraints. In the
next subsection, we will present some explicit formulas
to upper bound 〈e11〉 and lower bound 〈s11〉.
Similarly, all the relations among quantities δlr for all
possible lr can be written into∣∣∣∣∣
∑
lr∈J
NlrSlrδlr
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ nδ
√∑
lr∈J
NlrSlr, (38)
for all nonempty J ⊆ J and∑
lr∈J
NlrSlrδlr = 0. (39)
Specifically, if set J contains only one element lr, then
the relations presented in Eq.(38) is just the bounds for
each quantities δlr shown in Eq.(19).
6B. Formulas for improved analysis of statistical
fluctuations
Consider the upper bound of e11 first. As shown in
Eq.(26), the mean value 〈Tlr〉 is a function of τlr . Re-
placing Tlr by its mean value 〈Tlr〉 in Eq.(13), we get a
function about quantities τlr
ef11 = (T
f
+ − T f−)/(a1b1sf11), (40)
where
T f+ = Tˆ+ + Txxτxx + a0b0Tooτoo,
T f− = Tˆ− + a0Toxτox + b0Txoτxo,
with Tˆ± being the constant factors given by Eq.(14), s
f
11
being the lower bound of s11 that will be discussed below.
In order to obtain a proper estimation of the upper
bound of e11 from the function e
f
11, we need to find out
the worst case under the constraints about the quantities
τlr. That is to say, we need maximize the function e
f
11 of
variables τlr under the constraints shown in Eqs.(36, 37).
As discussed above, there are 502 joint constraints for
quantities τlr in each basis for this protocol. In princi-
ple, one can solve this optimization problem by the linear
programming (LP) method with all those 502 constraints
being listed in Eqs.(36, 37). However, this will cost huge
computation power in making full optimization of all pa-
rameters. Note that if we only use part of the constraints,
the final key will be still secure but the key rate could
be not the optimized result. Naturally, one may ask the
question whether we can still obtain the optimized or
almost optimized result if we only use a few of 502 con-
straints. The answer is yes. Actually, as shown below,
most of the constrains take no effect to the key rate and
they can be abandoned. Luckily, as we show below, we
can greatly reduce the number of joint constraints to 11
or even fewer. Moreover, we can even obtain explicit
formulas for the optimization problem.
Reconsidering the function ef11, we know that the signs
in front of T f+ and T
f
− are different. So we can treat
the variables in T f+ and T
f
− separately. That is to say,
equivalently, the maximization of ef11 can be divided
into two simple problems that are the maximization of
T f+ and the minimization of T
f
−. In maximizing T
f
+,
we only need to consider the sole joint constraint be-
tween variables τxx and τoo. Similarly, in minimizing
T f−, we only need to consider the sole joint constraint
between variables τox and τxo. These optimization prob-
lems can be solved by using the LP method. Further-
more, we can solve the problem analytically with ex-
plicit formulas. We consider the maximization of T f+
first. In this function, there are two variables τxx and
τoo. So we only need to consider the joint constraint
NxxTxxτxx+NooTooτoo ≤ nτ
√
NxxTxx +NooToo and the
bounds of τxx, τoo shown in Eq.(27). Explicitly, we have
T f+ ≤ Tˆ+ +
nτa0b0
Noo
√
NxxTxx +NooToo
+nτ
(
1
Nxx
− a0b0
Noo
)√
NxxTxx , T
f1
+ , (41)
when a0b0Nxx ≤ Noo, and
T f+ ≤ Tˆ+ +
nτ
Nxx
√
NxxTxx +NooToo
+nτ
(
a0b0
Noo
− 1
Nxx
)√
NooToo , T
f2
+ , (42)
otherwise.
Conclusively, according to Eq.(41) and Eq.(42), the up-
per bound of the function T f+ can be defined as T
f
+ = T
f1
+
when a0b0Nxx ≤ Noo and T f+ = T
f2
+ otherwise. Further-
more, we can easily prove that the upper bound T
f
+ is
reachable. So T
f
+ is just the maximum value of the func-
tion T f+ under the joint constraints.
For convenience, we can write T
f
+ uniformly by intro-
ducing the following notations
dxx = 1/Nxx, doo = a0b0/Noo.
Moreover, we use nature numbers 1, 2 to indicate these
two different subscripts xx and oo with ascending order
of dk(k = 1, 2). That is to say, we use nature number
1, 2 to indicate xx, oo respectively when dxx ≤ doo, and
to indicate oo, xx respectively when doo ≤ dxx. With
these preparations, we can write the maximum value of
T f+ uniformly
T
f
+ = Tˆ+ + nτd1
√
N1T1 +N2T2
+nτ (d2 − d1)
√
N2T2. (43)
Similarly, we can minimize the function T f− with
the boundary constraints τox ≥ −τox, τxo ≥ −τxo
and the joint constraint NoxToxτox + NxoTxoτxo ≥
−nτ
√
NoxTox +NxoTxo. In the symmetric case where
ak = bk, a
′
k = b
′
k, and Nlr = Nrl, the minimum value of
T f− can be easily obtained
T f− ≥ Tˆ− −
nτa0
Nox
√
NoxTox +NxoTxo , T
f
−, (44)
where we have used the symmetric conditions and the
joint constraint between τox and τxo. Generally, without
the symmetric case assumption, we can write the mini-
mum value of T f− into
T f− = Tˆ− − nτd1
√
N1T1 +N2T2
−nτ (d2 − d1)
√
N2T2, (45)
where we use nature numbers 1, 2 to indicate these two
different subscripts ox, xo with ascending order of dk(k =
1, 2) and dox = a0/Nox, dxo = b0/Nxo.
7With the maximum value T
f
+ and the minimum value
T f−, we can define the upper bound of e11 with the fol-
lowing explicit formula
ef11 = (T
f
+ − T f−)/(a1b1sf11), (46)
where T
f
+ and T
f
− are defined in Eq.(43) and Eq.(45)
respectively, sf11 is the lower bound of s11 that will be
studied in the coming.
Now we commit ourself to derive the explicit formula to
estimate the lower bound of s11. As is defined in Eq.(18),
the mean values 〈Slr〉 is the function of δlr. Replacing
Slr by its mean value 〈Slr〉 in Eq.(7), we get a function
about quantities δlr
sf111 = sˆ
(1)
11 + (S
f1
+ − Sf1− )/(a1a′1b˜12), (47)
where Sf1+ = S(1)+ (Sxxδxx, Soyδoy, Syoδyo, Sooδoo), Sf1− =
S(1)− (Syyδyy, Soxδox, Sxoδxo) with S(1)+ , S(1)− being defined
in Eqs.(8,9) respectively, and sˆ
(1)
11 being the constant fac-
tor defined in Eq.(7).
To obtain the lower bound of s11 from this function s
f1
11,
we need to find out the worst case under the constraints
about the quantities δlr. That is to say, we need minimize
the function sf111 of variables δlr under the constraints
shown in Eqs.(38,39). In the function sf111, we can see that
the signs in front of Sf1+ and S
f1
− are different. So we can
treat the variables in Sf1+ and S
f1
− separately. That is to
say, equivalently, the minimization of sf111 can be divided
into two simple problems that are the minimization of Sf1+
and the maximization of Sf1− . In minimizing S
f1
+ , we only
need to consider the constraints among variables δxx, δoy,
δyo and δoo. There are only 11 joint constraints in this
LP problem. Similarly, in maximizing Sf1− , we only need
to consider the constraints among variables δyy, δox and
δxo. Here there are only 4 joint constraints.
Similar to the upper bound of e11, we can also lower
bound s11 analytically. For clarity, we introduce the fol-
lowing theorem
Theorem 1 Consider the K−variable linear function
f(xk) =
∑K
k=1 αkxk with xk(k = 1, 2, · · · ,K;K ≤ 4)
and the following linear constraints∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈K
βkxk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ n0
√∑
k∈K
βk, K ⊆ {1, 2, · · · ,K} (48)
where n0 ≥ 0 and αk, βk ≥ 0 (k = 1, 2, · · · ,K). The
maximum value of f(xk) is
fmax = f(x˜
∗
k) = F(K,n0, Vα, Vβ)
= n0
K∑
k=1
(γ˜n − γ˜n−1)
√√√√ K∑
k=n
β˜n, (49)
with
x˜∗k =
n0
β˜k


√√√√ K∑
n=k
β˜n −
√√√√ K∑
n=k+1
β˜n

 , (k = 1, · · · ,K)
(50)
and the minimum value of f(xk) is
fmin = −fmax = f(−x˜∗k) = −F(K,n0, Vα, Vβ) (51)
given the following notations: 1, Vα = [α1, α2, · · · , αK ],
Vβ = [β1, β2, · · · , βK ], γ˜0 = 0, γk = αk/βk and γ˜k is the
k-th minimum value of {γk|k = 1, 2, · · · ,K} which means
that we use γ˜k to denote the values of {γk} with ascending
order. 2, ζ˜k is the rearrangement of ζk(ζ = α, β, x) so
that γ˜k = α˜k/β˜k(k = 1, 2, · · · ,K).
In Eq.(48), we use K to denote the subsects of
{1, 2, · · · ,K}. Then we know that there are ∑Kk=2 CkK
joint constraints and C1K = K boundary constraints
about xk(k = 1, 2, · · · ,K). For example, in the case
with K = 4, we have 11 joint constraints such as |β1x1+
β2x2 + β4x4| ≤ n0
√
β1 + β2 + β4 with K = {1, 2, 4} and
4 boundary constraints such as |x1| ≤ n0/
√
β1 with
K = {1}. Actually, the value fmax is an upper bound
of the function f(xk). On the other hand, we can prove
that the point Ps = (x˜
∗
1, x˜
∗
2, x˜
∗
3, x˜
∗
4) locates in the feasible
region. Details of the proof of this theorem can be see in
Appendix A.
By using the conclusion shown in Theorem 1 with K =
2, we can easily find out the maximum value of T f+ and
the minimum value of T f−. These values have been shown
above in Eq.(43) and Eq.(45) respectively.
As discussed above, the function Sf1+ contains four vari-
ables δxx, δoy, δyo and δoo. In order to find out the mini-
mum value of Sf1+ with the constraints shown in Eq.(38),
we can use Theorem 1 with K = 4 directly. Explicitly,
we have
Sf1+ ≥ −F(4, nδ, V +α , V +β ) , Sf1+ , (52)
where the function F is defined in Eq.(49) and V +α =
[a′1b
′
2Sxx, a1b2a
′
0Soy, a1b2b
′
0Syo, (a
′
1b
′
2a0b0−a1b2a′0b′0)Soo],
V +β = [NxxSxx, NoySoy, NyoSyo, NooSoo].
Similarly, for the function Sf1− with three variables δyy,
δox and δxo, we can estimate the maximum value of it by
using Theorem 1 with K = 3
Sf1− ≤ F(3, nδ, V −α , V −β ) , S
f1
− , (53)
where the function F is defined in Eq.(49) and V −α =
[a1b2Syy, a
′
1b
′
2a0Sox, a
′
1b
′
2b0Sxo], V
−
β = [NyySyy, NoxSox,
NxoSxo].
After these preparations, we obtain a lower bound of
s11 with the explicit formula
sf111 = sˆ
(1)
11 + (S
f1
+ − S
f1
− )/(a1a
′
1b˜12), (54)
8where sˆ
(1)
11 is defined in Eq.(7), S
f1
+ is the minimum values
of Sf1+ , S
f1
− is the maximum values of S
f1
− which are shown
in Eqs.(52,53) respectively.
Besides the lower bound sf111, we can obtain another
lower bound of s11 corresponding to sˆ
(2)
11 shown in
Eq.(10). Replacing Slr by its mean value 〈Slr〉 in Eq.(10),
we get a function about quantities δlr
sf211 = sˆ
(2)
11 +
Sf2+ − Sf2−
a1b1a˜12b˜12
, (55)
where sˆ
(2)
11 is a constant factor given by Eq.(10),
a˜12 = a1a
′
2 − a′1a2, b˜12 = b1b′2 − b′1b2 and
Sf2+ = S(2)+ (Sxxδxx, Soyδoy, Syoδyo, Sooδoo), Sf2− =
S(2)− (Sxyδxy, Syxδyx, Soxδox, Sxoδxo) with S(2)+ , S(2)− being
defined in Eqs.(11,12) respectively.
Similarly to the lower bound of sf111, we need to find
out the minimum value of Sf2+ and the maximum value
of Sf2− with the constraints shown in Eq.(38).
Using theorem 1, we can also find out the explicit for-
mulas for the minimum of Sf2+ and maximum of S
f2
− an-
alytically
Sf2+ ≥ −F(4, nδ,W+α ,W+β ) , Sf2+ , (56)
Sf2− ≤ F(4, nδ,W−α ,W−β ) , S
f2
− , (57)
where the function F is defined in Eq.(49) and
W+α = [gxxSxx, goySoy, gyoSyo, gooSoo], W
+
β = V
+
β ,
W−α = [gxySxy, gyxSyx, goxSox, gxoSxo], W
−
β = [NxySxy,
NyxSyx, NoxSox, NxoSxo].
With these estimations, we can write the other lower
bound of s11 into the explicit formula
sf211 = sˆ
(2)
11 +
Sf2+ − S
f2
−
a1b1a˜12b˜12
, (58)
where sˆ
(2)
11 is a constant factor defined by Eq.(10), S
f2
+ is
the minimum value of Sf2+ and S
f2
− is the maximum value
of Sf2− which are defined in Eqs.(56,57) respectively.
Combining these two lower bounds, we obtain our im-
proved estimation of the lower bound of s11. Explicitly,
we define
sf11 = max{sf111, sf211}, (59)
where sf111 and s
f2
11 are defined in Eq.(54) and Eq.(58)
respectively.
So far we have completed our analytical formulas. As
discussed above, result of our analytical method is the
same with that of the LP method which fully uses all
those 502 joint constraints.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we will present some results of nu-
merical simulations. We treat the statistical fluctuation
e0 ed pd ηd fe ǫ
0.5 1.5% 6.02 × 10−6 14.5% 1.16 1.0× 10−7
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numerical
simulations. e0 is the error rate of background. ed is the
misalignment-error probability. pd is the dark count rate. ηd
is the detection efficiency of all detectors. fe is the error
correction inefficiency. ǫ is the security bound considered in
the finite-date analysis.
jointly as studied earlier in this paper. We also optimize
all parameters by the method of full optimization[36]. We
shall compare our results with Ref.[36], which has pro-
posed the method of full optimization and has presented
obviously the best result among all prior art works. We
shall also compare our results with the result obtained
by what we called Traditional method, i.e., optimizing
all parameters but treating the statistical fluctuations of
different sources separately. Without any loss of general-
ity, we focus on the symmetric case where the two channel
transmissions from Alice to UTP and from Bob to UTP
are equal. Therefore we set pl = pr and also pX|l = pX|r
for any l = r. We also assume that the UTP’s detectors
are identical, i.e., they have the same dark count rates
and detection efficiencies, and their detection efficiencies
do not depend on the incoming signals. We shall esti-
mate what values would be probably observed for the
yields and error yields in the normal cases by the lin-
ear channel loss model as in [5, 19, 25, 35]. For a fair
comparison, we use the same experimental parameters
used in Ref.[36] for our numerical simulation, which are
mostly from the long-distance QKD experiment reported
in [38]. The values of these parameters are listed in Ta-
ble I. With this, the yields Slr and error yields Tlr can
be calculated [35] with coherent states with intensities
µo, µx, µy. The density matrix of the coherent state with
intensity µ can be written into ρ =
∑
k
e−µµk
k! |k〉〈k|. By
using these values, we can estimate the lower bounds of
sZ11 and the upper bounds of e
X
11 with different methods
presented in the above sections. With these prepara-
tions, we can calculate the final secret key rate with the
following formula [19]
R =
1
2
p2yp
2
Z|ya
′
1b
′
1s
Z
11[1−H(eX11)]− feSZyyH(EZyy), (60)
where SZyy and E
Z
yy denote, respectively, the yield and
error rate in Z-basis when Alice uses yA and Bob uses yB;
fe is the efficiency factor of the error correction method
used; sZ11 and e
X
11 are the yield and error rate when both
Alice and Bob send single-photon states.
To make a fair comparison, we need to find out the
full parameter optimizations for different methods [36].
Here we also use the well-known local search algorithm.
In this algorithm, we need to optimize the one-variable
nonlinear function in each step for the local search.
We consider the three-intensity protocol in the case of
9data-size Nt = 10
12. The optimal parameters and the
practical key rate per pulse for the distance 50km (stan-
dard fiber), with the statistical fluctuations, are shown in
Table II. The result presented in Ref.[36] is shown in the
2nd column. In the 3rd column, we show the optimal pa-
rameters after a full parameter optimization by using the
traditional analytical method with Eq.(24) and Eq.(28).
In the 4th column, we present the results after a full pa-
rameter optimization by using the improved analytical
method with explicit formulas in Eq.(59) and Eq.(46).
We can see that our new optimal key rate with full pa-
rameter optimization is better than the result presented
in Ref.[36]. The improvement of the optimal final key
rate R is about 97%. In Ref.[36], the lowest intensity is
10−6 which is too small to be obtained exactly in real
experimental. On the other hand, the optimal key rates
obtained by setting the lowest intensity to be 0 or 10−6
respectively are nearly equal to each other. Furthermore,
the improved method considered in this paper can apply
to the generalized situation that the lowest intensity is
not 0 [33]. In Table III, we show the optimal parame-
ters and the practical key rate per pulse for the distance
100km (standard fiber) with the statistical fluctuations.
In the 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns, we present the results
after a full parameter optimization by using the tradi-
tional method, the improved method with formulas and
the LP method with all joint constraints for statistical
fluctuations. We can see that our new full parameter
optimization can improve the key rate R by 146%.
More extensive comparison results are shown in Fig.1.
In this figure, we show the optimal key rate (per pulse)
in logarithmic scale as a function of the distance under a
practical setting with finite data-set Nt = 10
12.
V. CONCLUSION
Through studying the statistical fluctuations of dif-
ferent sources jointly, we obtain the improved statisti-
cal analysis with explicit formulas. Numerical simula-
tion shows that the results obtained from our improved
methods are significantly better than the results obtained
with the traditional methods treating statistical fluctua-
tions of each sources separately. In our study, we have
taken the same intensities in both bases. The result can
be further improved by taking different intensities in dif-
ferent bases and taking the decoy-state method in only
one basis as pointed out in [32]. This will be reported
elsewhere.
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Parameter Ref.[36] Traditional Improved
µy 0.25 0.396 0.401
µx 0.05 0.056 0.055
µo 1.0× 10
−6 0 0
py 0.58 0.646 0.681
px 0.30 0.256 0.243
pX|y 0.03 0.024 0.013
pX|x 0.71 0.737 0.709
pX|o 0.83 1.000 1.000
R 1.68 × 10−6 2.59× 10−6 3.31× 10−6
TABLE II: Comparison of parameters at 50kms (standard
fiber) for three-intensity protocol with statistical fluctuation
analysis in the case of data-size (total number of pulse pairs)
Nt = 10
12. The 2nd column is the result presented in Ref.[36].
The 3rd column is the optimal parameters after a full param-
eter optimization with explicit formulas Eq.(24) and Eq.(28).
The 4th column is the optimal parameters obtained with ex-
plicit formulas Eq.(59) and Eq.(46). Comparing with the re-
sult given by Xu et al[36], our improved result raises the key
rate R by 97%. We set the same probabilities for Alice and
Bob in choosing sources and bases, px, py: probabilities to
choose source x and y; pX|y, pX|x, pX|o : probabilities of
choosing X−basis selection conditional on sources y, x and o.
Note that in Ref.[36], source o is not strict vacuum.
Parameter Traditional Improved I Improved II
µy 0.269 0.275 0.275
µx 0.067 0.068 0.068
py 0.336 0.404 0.404
px 0.477 0.447 0.447
pX|y 0.132 0.084 0.084
pX|x 0.742 0.719 0.720
R 1.00 × 10−8 2.46 × 10−8 2.46 × 10−8
TABLE III: Comparison of parameters at 100kms (standard
fiber) for three-intensity protocol with statistical fluctuation
analysis with Nt = 10
12. The 2nd column is the optimal
parameters after a full parameter optimization with explicit
formulas Eq.(24) and Eq.(28). The 3rd column is the optimal
parameters obtained by our improved method with explicit
formulas Eq.(59) and Eq.(46). The 4th column is the optimal
parameters obtained by the LP method with all 502 joint con-
straints. We can see that our new full parameter optimization
can improve the key rate R by 146%. The results obtained by
using the numerical method and analytical methods are near
equal to each other.
10
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
10−10
10−9
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
Standard fiber link (km)
Ke
y 
ra
te
 (p
er 
pu
lse
)
 
 
Traditional
Improved: Our LP
Improved: Formulas
FIG. 1: (Color online) Optimal secret key rate (per pulse)
as a function of the distance under different methods of
three-intensity decoy-state protocol. Here we set Nt = 10
12.
Dashed curve: key rates obtained through traditional full op-
timization with simple worst-case treatment for fluctuations
in Eq.(24) and Eq.(28); Dashed-dotted curve: results from
the LP method which fully used all 502 joint constraints of
fluctuations; Solid curve: key rates from our formulas Eq.(59)
and Eq.(46) with joint treatment of fluctuations. In the sim-
ulation, we have taken a full parameter optimization for all
points.
Appendix A: The proof of Theorem 1
In section III, we need to use the conclusion of Theo-
rem 1 with K = 2, 3, 4. Actually, we only need to prove
the result with K = 4 since the cases with K = 2, 3 can
be treated as the special case with K = 4. Furthermore,
we only need to prove the situation in maximizing f(xk).
First, we show that the value fmax defined in Eq.(49)
is an upper bound of the function f(xk). Actually, the
function f(xk) can be written into
f(xk) =
4∑
k=1
γkβkxk =
4∑
k=1
γ˜kβ˜kx˜k
=
4∑
n=1
(γ˜n − γ˜n−1)
4∑
k=1
β˜kx˜k,
where γk, γ˜k, α˜k, β˜k and x˜k are defined in Theorem 1.
Accordingly, we know that γ˜1 ≤ γ˜2 ≤ γ˜3 ≤ γ˜4. So we
have γ˜n − γ˜n−1 ≥ 0 (n = 1, 2, 3, 4). On the other hand,
we know that
∑4
k=n β˜kx˜k ≤ n0
√∑4
k=n β˜k with the con-
straints shown in Eq.(48). Then we can conclude that
f(xk) ≤ n0
4∑
n=1
(γ˜n − γ˜n−1)
√√√√ 4∑
k=1
β˜k = fmax.
Secondly, we prove that the upper bound fmax is reach-
able. As discussed above, we have used four constraints
∑4
k=n β˜kx˜k ≤ n0
√∑4
k=n β˜k (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) in obtaining
the upper bound fmax. Then we can solve the linear sys-
tems
∑4
k=n β˜kx˜k = n0
√∑4
k=n β˜k (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) about
variables x˜k with
x˜∗k =
n0
β˜k


√√√√ 4∑
n=k
β˜n −
√√√√ 4∑
n=k+1
β˜n

 , (k = 1, 2, 3, 4).
In order to prove the upper bound fmax = f(x˜
∗
k) is
reachable, we only need to show that the point Ps =
(x˜∗1, x˜
∗
2, x˜
∗
3, x˜
∗
4) locates in the feasible region. That is to
say, we need to prove that all the constraints presented in
Eq.(48) with K = 4 are fulfilled when x˜k = x˜
∗
k. Equiv-
alently, the constraints in Eq.(48) with K = 4 can be
rewritten into
∑
k∈K
β˜kx˜k ≤ n0
√∑
k∈K
β˜k, K ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4}. (A1)
There are
∑4
k=1 Ck4 = 15 constraints in Eq.(A1). In the
following, we will group these 15 cases into 4 situations.
In the first situation, we consider the constraints with
K = K(1)n (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) and K(1)1 = {4}, K(1)2 = {3, 4},
K(1)3 = {2, 3, 4}, K(1)4 = {1, 2, 3, 4}. In this situation, we
can easily calculate that
∑
k∈K
(1)
n
β˜kx˜k = n0
√ ∑
k∈K
(1)
n
β˜k, (n = 1, 2, 3, 4).
In the second situation, we consider the constraints
with K = K(2)n (n = 1, 2, · · · , 6) and K(2)1 = {1},
K(2)2 = {2}, K(2)3 = {3}, K(2)4 = {1, 2}, K(2)5 = {2, 3},
K(2)6 = {1, 2, 3}. In this situation, the following mean
value theorem should be used
√
y1 + y2 ≤ √y1 +√y2, (y1, y2 ≥ 0).
Taking K = K(2)5 as an example, we have
∑
k∈K
(2)
5
β˜kx˜k = n0
√
β˜2 + β˜3 + β˜4−n0
√
β˜4 ≤ n0
√
β˜2 + β˜3.
We can also prove the other cases in the same way.
In the third situation, we consider the constraints with
K = K(3)n (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) and K(3)1 = {1, 4}, K(3)2 = {2, 4},
K(3)3 = {1, 2, 4}, K(3)4 = {1, 3, 4}. In this situation, we
need the following lemma
Lemma 1 Given four nonnegative variables y1, y2, z1,
z2 and y1 + y2 = z1 + z2, we have
√
y1 +
√
y2 ≤ √z1 +√z2, (A2)
if and only if |y1 − y2| ≥ |z1 − z2|.
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Proof : Denote y1 + y2 = z1 + z2 = c0. We can easily
prove that y1y2 ≤ z1z2 if and only if |y1 − c0/2| ≥ |z1 −
c0/2|. On the other hand, √y1 + √y2 ≤ √z1 + √z2
if and only if y1y2 ≤ z1z2 when y1, y2, z1, z2 ≥ 0 and
y1 + y2 = z1 + z2. Furthermore, we know that |y1 −
c0/2| ≥ |z1 − c0/2| if and only if |y1 − y2| ≥ |z1 − z2|
when y1 + y2 = z1 + z2 = c0. This complete the proof of
Lemma 1.
With the conclusion presented in Lemma 1, we can
easily prove the constraints are fulfilled in this situation.
Taking K = K(3)2 as an example, we have
∑
k∈K
(3)
2
β˜kx˜k = n0
√
β˜2 + β˜3 + β˜4 − n0
√
β˜3 + β˜4
+n0
√
β˜4 ≤ n0
√
β˜2 + β˜4.
As defined above, β˜k ≥ 0(k = 1, 2, 3, 4). In the last
inequality, we have used Lemma 1 with y1 = β˜2+ β˜3+ β˜4,
y2 = β˜4 and z1 = β˜2 + β˜4, z2 = β˜3 + β˜4.
In the last situation, there is only one constraint re-
mained with K = K(4)1 = {1, 3}. We need to prove
that
√
β˜1 + β˜2 + β˜3 + β˜4−
√
β˜2 + β˜3 + β˜4+
√
β˜3 + β˜4−√
β˜4 ≤
√
β˜1 + β˜3. Equivalently, we need to show that√
β˜1 + β˜2 + β˜3 + β˜4 +
√
β˜3 + β˜4 ≤
√
β˜2 + β˜3 + β˜4 +√
β˜1 + β˜3 +
√
β˜4. We can easily prove this inequality
by taking squares of two sides twice with eliminating the
same terms on the two sides in each step.
Conclusively, the upper bound fmax is reachable with
Ps locates in the feasible region of the LP problem. That
is to say, fmax is really the maximum value of f(x˜k) with
x˜k = x˜
∗
k. Similarly, we know that the minimum value of
f(xk) is fmin = f(−x˜∗k) = −fmax. This complete the
proof of Theorem 1 with K = 4. The conclusions with
K = 2, 3 can be proved in the same way.
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